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There has been growing public attention to the
accumulation and spending of endowments in recent
years. Scholars have offered different theories on the
objective of endowments that have different implica-
tions for endowment spending. Yet, there are limited
empirical studies and they mostly focus on universities.
Using the Form 990 data between 2009 and 2016, this
study examines how endowments are actually spent for
four types of operating charities, including museums,
universities, hospitals, and K-12 schools. The descrip-
tive results show that there are considerable cross-
sectional differences in endowment characteristics
across these types of organizations. The fixed effects
analyses further demonstrate different types of organi-
zations have different payout responses to changes in
endowment returns, non-endowment income, and con-
tributions to endowment. However, the study does not
find any empirical evidence that organizations use
endowments as rainy day funds. This article extends
the understanding on endowment spending behavior
from universities to other types of operating charities
that also hold endowments. The findings provide
empirical evidence that may inform the existing debate
on endowment spending and have practical implica-
tions for endowment management.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The accumulation and spending of endowments have been under public scrutiny for years. For
instance, the media has criticized rich elite universities with large endowments for being stingy
with financial aid for low-income students (e.g., Lewin, 2008; Zinshteyn, 2016). Following vari-
ous policy proposals in recent years, the Congress passed Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, impos-
ing a tax on the endowment earnings of a small number of private nonprofit colleges and
universities (Baum & Lee, 2019).
The concern over endowment hoarding is especially evident during times of crisis. Taking sev-
eral large institutions as examples (e.g., Harvard University, Yale University, J. Paul Getty
Museum, the Shriners Hospitals for Children), Weisbrod and Asch (2010) point out that many
nonprofits are taking the wrong approach in managing their endowments. Instead of using endow-
ments as rainy day funds during the 2008 recession, they cut programs to preserve endowments.
With the COVID-19 pandemic causing tremendous financial challenges, endowed non-
profits are facing the same issue again: should they increase the rate of endowment spending to
weather the storm? Some well-endowed universities still have no plans to use endowment funds
to sustain financial losses during the pandemic (Thorbecke, 2020), while some cultural organi-
zations have decided to tap more heavily into their endowments (Bowley & Jacobs, 2020).
Irvin (2007) suggests that it is prudent to conserve endowment assets now for future social
benefits given the patterns of charitable giving and generational wealth transfers. However, she
also admits that the decision to allow nonprofits to accumulate even larger endowments does
not rest easily. Indeed, a true endowment always faces the dilemma between preserving the
fund's real purchasing power over time for the benefits of future generations and meeting the
needs of the current generation. It becomes a particularly challenging issue in times of crisis
when both endowment returns and other revenues take a hit.
Existing theories offer different implications for endowment payout practice. Tobin (1974,
p. 427) states that university endowments should be used in a way that “the existing endow-
ment can continue to support the same set of activities that it is now supporting,” independent
of other income sources and prospects of future gifts. Different from this view, Merton's (1993)
model treats endowment payouts as one of many revenue sources for a university, suggesting
that endowments should be used to hedge against the overall financial risk.
Although there is abundant theoretical literature on how endowment should be spent,
empirical research on how endowments are actually spent is limited. Understanding endow-
ment spending behavior would provide insights for the ongoing theoretical inquiry and policy
debate on the objectives and spending of endowment funds. There are only a few empirical
studies on endowment spending and they mostly focus on university endowments (e.g., Brown,
Dimmock, Kang, & Weisbenner, 2014; Brown & Tiu, 2014; Rosen & Sappington, 2019).
Besides universities, there are other types of nonprofits that also hold considerable endow-
ment assets, such as museums, hospitals, independent schools, among others. Compared to uni-
versities, these organizations face different operating environments, have different business
models and revenue portfolio characteristics (Qu, 2019), which may have an influence on their
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endowment behavior. For example, museums generally have diversified operating revenue streams
from private donations, government funding, and admission fees and sales (e.g., gift shops). While
both private universities and K-12 schools are reliant on tuition, the former receive more non-
tuition revenue (e.g., gifts, hospital revenue, sales, and services of educational activities). Nonprofit
hospitals, facing direct competition from their for-profit counterparts, are perhaps the most com-
mercialized type of nonprofits, and are also more reliant on debt to finance capital expenditures
(e.g., equipment, facilities). Different types of organizations also differ in their dependence on
endowment payouts, with arts and higher education nonprofits more reliant on endowment to
support their annual expenses than other education nonprofits and hospitals (Calabrese &
Ely, 2017). Therefore, this study separately examines the endowment spending of different types of
nonprofits.
Building on prior research on university endowments and using a different dataset, the cur-
rent study extends the understanding of nonprofit endowment spending behavior to several
other types of organizations. It focuses on four different types of operating public charities that
hold the most endowment wealth, including museums, universities, K-12 Schools, and hospi-
tals. Using the Form 990 data filed electronically with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
between 2009 and 2016, this study 1) uses descriptive analyses to examine the characteristics of
endowments and highlight the heterogeneity in endowment behavior across types of organiza-
tions; and 2) employs fixed-effects regressions to examine whether organizations adjust their
endowment spending responding to changes in endowment funds and operations. Specifically,
are endowment payout rates associated with changes in endowment investment returns, other
operating income, or contributions to endowment? The data cover a period of economic growth
following the 2008 recession, when extreme financial challenges were probably less commonly
experienced. However, with declining markets in 2011 and 2015, it is still meaningful to test if
endowment payout rates respond differently to endowment returns.
The article proceeds as follow. It first provides an overview of endowment payout policies. It
then reviews theoretical and empirical literature on endowment objectives and spending behav-
ior, and present hypotheses. Next, it describes data, sample, and methodology. Third, it presents
the descriptive and regression results. Finally, it concludes with a discussion on the empirical
results and implications.
2 | BACKGROUND
2.1 | What is endowment?
Scholars have defined endowment differently. Some use the term more strictly to include only
permanently restricted investment reserves (Hager, 2006), while others define it more broadly
to encompass both long-term investment assets and board-designated operating reserves
(Bowman, 2007). The official definition by American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) refers to endowment as “an established fund of cash, securities, or other assets to pro-
vide income for the maintenance of a not-for-profit entity” (2013, p. 145). Typically, the endow-
ment reported by a nonprofit on the IRS Form 990 (post-2008) is a combination of “true
endowment” (permanently restricted net assets), “term endowment” (temporarily restricted net
assets), and “quasi-endowment” (board-designated unrestricted funds). Therefore, this article
defines endowment broadly as a collection of both restricted and unrestricted assets managed
to provide an income stream for the current and future operations of a nonprofit organization.
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2.2 | Endowment spending practice
2.2.1 | The law
Unlike private non-operating foundations, which are legally required by the IRS to distribute at
least 5 % of their net investment assets annually, there are no laws governing how much operat-
ing charities should spend from their endowments. Nonetheless, the Uniform Prudent Manage-
ment of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA), adopted in all states by 2012, provides general
guidance to nonprofits on investment and spending of permanently restricted endowment
funds. Different from its predecessor Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act
(UMIFA), UPMIFA allows nonprofits to spend from an “underwater” endowment (i.e., below
the historic dollar value of an original gift) if the governing board determines it is prudent.
Specifically, when deciding to spend or accumulate, UPMIFA (2006) provides seven factors
that an institution should consider besides the original donor intent, including:
the duration and preservation of the endowment fund; the purposes of the institu-
tion and endowment fund; general economic conditions; the possible effects of
inflation or deflation; the expected total return from income and appreciation of
investments, other resources of the institution; and the investment policy of the
institution (p. 19).
Under the general legal guidance, the governing board of an endowed nonprofit decides the
organization's endowment spending rules in its endowment investment policy statement.
2.2.2 | Spending rules
Sedlacek and Jarvis (2010) summarized four major types of spending rules used by university
endowments that are also applicable to other types of nonprofits. These rules include simple
rules, inflation-based rules, smoothing rules, and hybrid rules.
First, the simple rules refer to spending only current income (i.e., interest and dividends), or
a pre-specified percentage of the endowment beginning market value, or deciding on an appro-
priate spending rate each year.
Second, some organizations use inflation-adjusted rules, that is, annual endowment spend-
ing grows at a pre-determined inflation rate (i.e., inflate last year's spending dollars by a price
index) and may be bounded by lower and upper bands (e.g., between 3 and 6% of the endow-
ment value). Compared to the moving average method described below, the banded inflation
method is less volatile, allowing organizations to spend more (less) during falling (rising)
markets.
Third, the majority of organizations spend a pre-specified percentage of the moving average
of the past endowment market values (usually past 3 years or 12 quarters). Despite its goal of
smoothing volatility in spending, the moving average method results in spending surge during
strongly rising markets that increase endowment market values and spending cuts during
sharply or sustained falling markets that decrease endowment values.
Finally, some organizations use hybrid spending rules (i.e., Yale/Stanford spending rule),
where spending rate is based on a weighted average of both a moving average market value
component and an inflation-adjusted component. Compared to the moving average method,
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the hybrid method does not increase spending as high during rising markets, nor does it cut
spending as deeply during severe market losses.
According to the Commonfund Institute studies on universities and colleges (2018) and
independent schools (2018a), the predominant spending method among the participating insti-
tutions is the moving average method. Similar patterns are also found among a small sample of
operating charities (Commonfund Institute, 2013). In addition, Brown and Tiu (2014) found
that larger university endowments and those more dependent on endowment payouts for their
operating budgets tend to use inflation-adjusted rules and hybrid rules, which are associated
with larger average payout rates than other rules.
2.2.3 | Policy versus effective spending rate
The policy spending rate is specified in a nonprofit's endowment policy statement, and the
effective spending rate is calculated as dividing the actual dollars spent in a year by the begin-
ning endowment market value. Depending on the spending rule, an organization's effective
spending rate can deviate from its policy rate and vary from year to year.i The study observes
effective rates than policy rates.
3 | LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS
This section first introduces four theoretical models of endowment objectives and their implica-
tions on endowment spending. It then discusses the mixed empirical evidence on university
endowment spending behavior. At the end of the section, it presents the hypotheses based on
both the theoretical and empirical literature.
3.1 | Intergenerational equity
Competing theories regarding the goals of endowment funds have different implications for
endowment spending behavior. According to Tobin's (1974) model, the trustees of an endowed
institution are to preserve intergenerational equity so that “the existing endowment can con-
tinue to support the same set of activities that it is now supporting” (p. 427). It suggests that
trustees decide payouts based on endowments alone, not affected by the prospect of future gifts
to endowments or other current income streams. Similarly, Bowman (2007) suggested adopting
an endowment spending formula that protects its real purchasing power over time, and warned
against increasing spending above the policy payout rate even during a financial crisis. Building
upon Tobin's model, subsequent research develops models that provide predictions on endow-
ment spending behavior. For example, Dybvig's model (1999) additionally assumes that univer-
sity endowments seek to avoid reducing payout amounts, suggests that the payout rate
decreases following positive shocks to endowment returns and increases with negative shocks.
Gilbert and Hrdlicka (2015) show that endowment payout rates should respond symmetrically,
and of small magnitude, to both positive and negative shocks to endowment returns. Therefore,
an endowment with the objective of preserving intergenerational equity may adjust its annual
payout rate according to changes in endowment returns but not to changes in operating
income.
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3.2 | A rainy day fund
An alternative model suggests that the goal of endowments is to protect against adverse revenue
shocks. In a discussion on why universities hold endowments, Hansmann (1990) noted that
one of the most compelling reasons for endowment accumulation was to serve as a buffer
against financial adversity. However, Hansmann (1990, p. 26) also noted that “there is little
affirmative evidence that universities have viewed their endowments principally as buffers for
their operating budgets, even during the severe financial crisis of recent years.” Following the
2008 recession, Weisbrod and Asch (2010) suggested that “nonprofits should treat at least some
portion of their endowment as a rainy day fund, a source of money that is available to make up
for those unexpected, yet predictable, times when income drops or demand for services
increases.” Viewing an organization's endowment fund in relation to its other sources of
income potentially affect endowment investment portfolio choice (Black, 1976; Merton, 1993)
and have implications for its spending policy. Under this model, organizations would spend
more conservatively in good times for precautionary savings while quickly increase spending
responding to negative income shocks (Conti-Brown, 2011). Thus, an endowment with the
objective of serving as a rainy fund may increase the annual payout rate responding to negative
shocks to operating income but not to positive operating income shocks or changes in endow-
ment returns.
3.3 | Agency problems
Even if the stated goal of an endowment is to preserve integrational equity or serve as a rainy
day fund, agency problems in endowment management may lead to behavioral deviations from
the stated objective. Hansmann (1990) pointed out that the management and other stakeholders
of a nonprofit might have preferences different from the stated endowment objectives. Later
empirical research reports evidence of agency problems associated with endowments (using dif-
ferent proxies). For example, Fisman and Hubbard (2003, 2005) found that organizations in
states with weaker government oversight allocated a higher proportion of inflows of donations
for managerial compensation and a smaller proportion to endowment (i.e., net assets). Core,
Guay, and Verdi (2006) found that nonprofit organizations with excess endowments (i.e., cash,
savings, and investment securities) had lower program expenses but higher CEO pay and direc-
tor compensation, although subsequent research reported weaker evidence supporting such a
relationship (Calabrese & Gupta, 2019; Ramirez, 2011). The potential agency problems may
offer an explanation on why the actual payout rate of an endowment may deviate from the
stated endowment objective and policy spending rate.
3.4 | Endowment accumulation as an end itself
Additionally, simply having a large and growing endowment can be an objective itself
(Hansmann, 1990), as institutions may use their endowments as “a symbol of prestige” and a
measure of institutional success compared to their peers (Conti-Brown, 2011, p. 699). This
implies that organizations may limit endowment spending, increase spending slowly (if at all)
following positive endowment shocks to grow the endowment value while reduce spending
after negative endowment shocks to control the damage to the endowment. Brown et al. (2014)
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provided supporting empirical evidence. Naming this behavior “endowment hoarding,” they
noted that university and endowment leadership might seek to maintain a large endowment for
reasons beyond supporting university operations (e.g., prestige). Therefore, the payout rate of
an endowment with this objective may decrease following negative endowment shocks while
remaining unchanged following positive endowment shocks or changes in operating income.
3.5 | Empirical evidence on endowment spending
The empirical studies on endowment spending behavior have largely focused on universities.
Two studies report mixed findings on the impact of endowment shocks on university endow-
ment spending. Defining shocks as the difference between the actual and expected normalized
endowment returns, Brown et al. (2014) found that universities actively reduced endowment
payouts responding to negative contemporaneous endowment shocks but left their payouts
unchanged following positive contemporaneous shocks between 1993 and 2009. They did not
find consistent evidence that universities adjust endowment spending responding to revenue
shocks. In contrast, Rosen and Sappington (2019) found that payout amounts responded sym-
metrically to positive and negative endowment shocks in the prior year, using the same data
but a different measure for shocks (i.e., unexpected changes in endowment values). They did
not examine revenue shocks in their analyses.
Additionally, Brown and Tiu (2014) found that half of the sample changed their spending
policies at least once between 2003 and 2011. They found that large university endowments and
funds with lower past returns and lower payout levels were more likely to change their spend-
ing policies, but those with the ability to use temporary special appropriations were less likely
to do so. Noting contributions to endowment as an alternative way of funding spending needs,
they found that it had a negligible effect on spending rule changes.
There is limited research on endowment spending for nonprofits other than universities.
Dahiya and Yermack (2018) used the newly available endowment fund information from the
IRS e-filer data and found that most endowments appear to spend conservatively between 2009
and 2017, with a median payout rate below 2.5%. While most tiny endowments made no distri-
butions at all, larger endowments paid out about 4.5% of their endowment market value. How-
ever, their study did not examine the changes in endowment payout rates using panel data
analysis.
The current study examines if changes in endowment payout rates are correlated with
changes in endowment returns, non-endowment operating income growth, and contributions
to endowment for other types of nonprofits besides just universities. Because the objective of an
endowment is unknown, it is hard to predict the direction of payout responses for different
types of organizations. Based on the competing theories of endowment objectives as well as the
mixed empirical evidence on university endowment spending behavior, the two-tailed null
hypotheses are formulated as follows:
H1: Changes in endowment payout rates are not related to changes in endowment
returns.
H2: Changes in endowment payout rates are not related to changes in operating
income growth.
H3: Changes in endowment payout rates are not related to changes in contributions
to endowment.
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4 | DATA AND SAMPLE
4.1 | Data cleaning
This study uses data from the IRS Forms 990 filed electronically by 501(c)(3) public charities
between 2009 and 2016, which are posted by the IRS on Amazon Web Services. Organizations'
endowment fund information is available via Schedule D Part V and other information is from
the core file. The data collection started with obtaining all organization-year observations with
information on Scheduled D Part V, which identified all endowed public charities that have e-
filed with the IRS. Then, each organization's annual endowment fund information was merged
with its corresponding core file.
4.1.1 | Cleaning schedule D
Dahiya and Yermack (2018) offer helpful guidance for cleaning Schedule D data. The initial
sample included 205,339 organization-year observations with Schedule D Part V Endowment
Funds information. After replacing missing values with later filings of historical data,ii as well
as excluding duplicate reports and non-public charities, there were 226,257 observations. Fur-
ther cleaning focused on Line 1 items on Schedule D Part V, which include (a) beginning of
year balance, (b) contributions, (c) net investment earnings/gains/losses, (d) grants or scholar-
ship, (e) other expenditures for facilities and programs, (f) administrative expenses
(if investment earnings are reported on a gross basis), and (g) end of year balance.
First, reports with negative contributions were dropped. The negative values for expense
items—grants or scholarships, other expenditures for facilities and programs, and administra-
tive expenses—were replaced with their absolute values.
Second, following Dahiya and Yermack (2018), reports were excluded if their beginning or end-
ing balance was missing, zero, or negative because they were likely to represent cases in which
organizations either just created or liquidated their endowments. Moreover, reports with zero
investment earnings, gains, or losses were excluded because they were likely to be endowments
with only illiquid assets that did not make investment returns and/or distributions annually.
Third, the difference between beginning and ending endowment balance should be equal to
the difference between the input to the endowment (contributions plus investment earnings/
gains/losses minus administrative expenses) and withdrawals from the endowment (grants plus
other expenditures) (Dahiya & Yermack, 2018). However, this was not the case for all filings,
suggesting reporting errors. Therefore, those with discrepancies larger than 1% of the beginning
endowment balance were dropped.
Fourth, very small endowment funds, those with less than $10,000 in beginning balance,
were excluded because of the immaterial fund size and because they tend to skew the sample
with extremely small or large returns on endowment.
Finally, there were some extremely large or small annual returns on endowment invest-
ment. Following Dahiya and Yermack (2018), the top and bottom 0.1% of the observations for
returns were dropped to avoid the undue influence of these outliers on the results. Moreover, to
observe within-organization variations in both contemporaneous and lagged annual returns, I
required at least 3 years' observations for annual returns per each organization, thus organiza-
tions with only one- or two-year returns were excluded. After the above cleaning process, the
endowment fund sample included 165,500 observations.iii
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4.1.2 | Cleaning core file
The cleaned endowment fund sample was then merged with the corresponding core files. There
were 151,772 observations with both endowment fund information and core files. Following
prior research (e.g., Bowman, Tuckman, & Young, 2012; Calabrese, 2013), observations with
negative gross revenue items (i.e., contributions, program service revenue), those with no total
expenses, and those with negative or zero assets were excluded. Reports that were group returns
for affiliates and those operating in non-US states were also excluded. Additionally, to observe
within-organization variations in both contemporaneous and lagged non-endowment income
(i.e., other sources of income that are not distributed from or transferred to endowment), orga-
nization with less than 3 years' annual growth rates of non-endowment income were excluded.
Finally, trusts, supporting organizations, foundations, mutual benefit organizations
(e.g., insurance providers, pension & retirement funds), and other similar organizations were
out of scope for this study. After the above cleaning process, the sample included 99,253
observations.
4.2 | Sample selection
This study further selected four types of operating public charities that hold considerable
endowment assets, including museums (NTEE A50-A57), universities (B40-B43), K-12 schools
(B20-29), and hospitals (E20-24).
The sample selection was, first of all, informed by prior research that report varying endow-
ment behavior across types of organizations. For example, Calabrese and Ely (2017) find that
different types of organizations differ in their dependence on endowment payouts. The
Commonfund Institute (2018b) reports institutional differences in endowment asset allocation,
which largely drives the variations in investment returns. On average, colleges and universities
allocate over half of their investment portfolios to alternative assets (relatively illiquid and more
risky than traditional equity investments) and the least proportion to fixed income and short-
term investments, while health care organizations allocate the highest proportion to fixed
income and only a quarter to alternative assets. In addition, Qu (2020) finds that the association
between background risk (i.e., volatility of non-endowment income) and endowment portfolio
volatility is significantly negative for universities, but not for other types of operating charities,
implying different endowment objectives and asset allocation strategies across types of organi-
zations. Therefore, mixing all types of organizations together in one analysis may obscure
important differences among them.
The sample selection was based on both the significance of endowment assets (i.e., which
subsector/types of organizations had the most endowment assets) and the prevalence of endow-
ment funds (i.e., which subsectors/types had the largest number of endowed organizations).
Calabrese and Ely (2017) find that although endowments exist in all major nonprofit subsectors,
the majority of the endowment assets were owned by higher education nonprofits (63.7%),
followed by other education nonprofits (7.7%), hospitals (7.3%), and arts organizations (5.1%) in
2012. In the current study, arts, culture, and humanities organizations accounted for nearly 16%
of the cleaned sample, education organizations (both higher education and other education)
made up 23%, and health organizations 11%.3 Each major group, however, represents a broad
subsector that includes different types of nonprofits. For example, both museums and university
presses belong to the arts and culture group, universities, preschools, and parent & teacher
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groups are all in the education group, and hospitals and blood banks in the health group.
Therefore, instead of analyzing the major groups, mixing apples, and oranges, this study focuses
on specific types of organizations within each subsector that hold the most endowment assets,
that is, museums, universities, K-12 schools, and hospitals.
5 | EMPIRICAL MODEL AND VARIABLES
A fixed effects model is used to examine if the changes in annual endowment payout rates are
related to contemporaneous and lagged changes in endowment investment returns, non-
endowment operating income, and contributions to endowment. The model is described as
follows:
Payout Ratei,t = β1ROIPi,t + β2ROIN i,t + β3ROIPi,t−1 + β4ROIN i,t−1 + β5RevGrowthPi,t
+ β6RevGrowthN i,t + β7RevGrowthPi,t−1 + β8RevGrowthN i,t−1
+ β9 Contri Endowi,t + β10Contri Endowi,t−1 +Zi + δt + εi,t
5.1 | Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the actual payout rate of organization i in year t. Specifically, the
annual payout amount is the sum of “grants or scholarships” and “other expenditures for facili-
ties and programs” reported on Form 990 Schedule D (Calabrese & Ely, 2017). And the annual
payout rate is calculated as the payout amount divided by the beginning endowment balance.
5.2 | Independent variables
5.2.1 | Endowment returns
Whether spending a percentage of the income return or total return, the endowment spending
rules reviewed earlier show that endowment returns appear to be an important factor of endow-
ment spending. The question is: do organizations spend more (or less) than usual when
experiencing a windfall (or unexpected loss in returns)? Prior studies provide mixed evidence
on how universities respond to negative and positive “shocks” to endowment returns (Brown
et al., 2014; Rosen & Sappington, 2019). Both studies cover a long period that includes two
recessions (2001–2002 and 2008–2009), making it feasible to examine payout responses to
shocks. Due to data availability, the current study only observes the post-recession years
between 2009 and 2016. Therefore, this paper focuses on changes in endowment returns rather
than shocks. Nonetheless, with declining markets in 2011 and 2015, it is still meaningful to test
if endowment payout rates respond differently to endowment returns.
The annual return on endowment investment (ROI) is calculated as “net investment earn-
ings, gains, and losses” divided by the beginning endowment balance. Taking a similar
approach by Brown et al. (2014), the annual returns are decomposed into positive returns
(ROIP) and negative returns (ROIN) to allow for examinations of possible asymmetric payout
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responses. For example, an organization may adjust its payout rates in response to changes in
negative endowment returns but not to positive returns, or the other way around.
ROIP =max 0,ROIP½ 
ROIN =min ROIN,0½ 
5.2.2 | Non-endowment income growth rates
The annual growth rates of non-endowment income are included to test the objective of endow-
ments as a rainy day fund in explaining endowment spending, that is, whether endowment pay-
out rates increase with decreasing operating income. Including this variable also controls for
any changes that might be correlated with the changes in endowment returns. The non-
endowment operating income variable is constructed as contributions and grants (core file,
Part I, line 8) plus program service revenue (core file, Part I, line 9) and other revenue (core file,
Part I, line 11) minus contributions to endowment (Schedule D, Part V, line 1b), excluding
investment income (core file, Part I, line 10). As in the case of endowment returns, the annual
growth rates of non-endowment income are also decomposed into positive and negative parts.
RevGrowthP =max 0,RevGrowthP½ 
RevGrowthN =min RevGrowthN,0½ 
As explained by Brown et al. (2014), it is an econometric dilemma to include or exclude the
non-endowment income growth variables in the fixed effects model. On the one hand, if the
income growth variables are endogenous, including them in the model would bias their coeffi-
cients. It is possible that an organization adjusts its revenue-generating strategy when expecting
changes in endowment spending in coming years.iv Nonetheless, it may take longer than a year
for a nonprofit to change its revenue structure and/or for that change to effectively address
endowment spending decrease. Moreover, because the sample of public charities rely more on
other types of operating income than endowment income, it is reasonable to assume that non-
profits typically do not adjust their revenue structure according to their anticipated changes in
endowment spending or performance but the other way around. On the other hand, if exclud-
ing these income growth variables, and they are correlated with both the endowment payout
and return variables, then the model has an omitted variable problem that would bias the
coefficients on the return variables. Therefore, I run the specifications without and with
non-endowment income growth as robustness checks. Results show that including the non-
endowment income variables do not change the coefficients on the investment return variables
in all specifications, thus mitigating the endogeneity concerns.
5.2.3 | Contributions to endowments
Endowment returns are not the only source of endowment spending.v Nonprofits may also
receive donations to their endowments, either as restricted gifts that increase the size of current
endowments, or as pass-through gifts that are earmarked for direct expenditure (e.g., Brown,
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Dimmock, & Weisbenner, 2012; Brown & Tiu, 2014). In the former case, organizations using the
moving-average spending rule may experience a decreasing payout rate following an increased
endowment balance. In the latter case, we expect an increasing payout rate due to increased pay-
out amounts and generally unchanged endowment balance. Additionally, organizations with con-
tributions to endowment that support current expenditures may also be less responsive to
changes in endowment returns or non-endowment income, due to the additional funding source.
Contributions to endowments are expressed as a percentage to endowment beginning balance.
5.2.4 | Lagged independent variables
There are reasons to believe that endowment payout responses may operate with a lag. For
example, for organizations following a moving-average spending rule, a change in the endow-
ment value in the current year should affect future payouts. Organizations may also plan for
their operational budgets based on prior year's operating income. Therefore, the model includes
both contemporaneous and lagged variables.
5.2.5 | Fixed effects
The model includes organizational fixed effects Zi to account for any unobservable time-
invariant characteristics of an organization that may affect its endowment spending, such as
the adopted endowment spending rules and stated endowment objectives. The model also
includes the time fixed effects δt to control for factors that affect all organizations' decisions in a
given year, such as the general economic conditions and the state of financial markets.vi
6 | DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS: CHARACTERISTICS OF
ENDOWMENTS
Before turning to regressions, this section presents the descriptive results on the characteristics
of the endowed nonprofits. We first review two special cases—zero payout and very high payout
rates, and then present the sample statistics.
6.1 | Zero payout
Notably, over 20% of the organization-year observations reported zero payout between 2009 and
2016. By type of organizations, the percentage of organization-year observations with zero pay-
out is much smaller for universities (8.3%) than museums (25.4%), K-12 schools (27.1%), and
hospitals (29.0%). On average, compared to the organizations that never reported zero payout
during the sample period, those with zero payout in at least 1 year has much smaller endow-
ment funds, lower endowment returns, smaller payout amounts, lower average annual payout
rates, and higher volatility of annual payout rates (Table 1). The differences in all these vari-
ables between the two groups are statistically significant (p < .001). These results corroborate
the findings by Dahiya and Yermack (2018), who reported that over a third of their sample
made no payouts at all and most were tiny endowments.
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Most of the spending rules described previously has a goal of limiting spending volatility.
Obviously, paying out in some years but not in others makes endowment distributions an unsta-
ble income stream for organizations. One might ask under what circumstances an endowment
pays out nothing. Although the data provide no direct answers, there are several possibilities. It
could be that the organization, especially when its endowment fund is small, has not established
a spending rule but decides its payout on a casual basis. It could be that smaller endowments use
a different strategy, making no distributions before their endowment funds accumulate to a criti-
cal mass (Dahiya & Yermack, 2018). It is also possible that the organization chooses not to spend
when its endowment fund is underwater, despite that the UPMIFA permits such spending. This
study examines organizations with a stable spending policy, thus excluding the organizations that
reported zero payout in any year (1,449 organizations, 9,671 organization-year observations).
6.2 | High payout rates
Besides zero payout, there are also some very high payout rates. The median payout rates are rela-
tively close for the four types of organizations, ranging from 4.3% for universities and 4.9% for
museums. However, the average payout rates vary quite a bit, from 5.1% for universities to 12.3%
for hospitals. In particular, hospitals have much lower payout rates at the lower quartile (below 2%)
than other types of organizations, but much higher payout rates at the higher quartile (over 13%).
A payout rate of 50%, for example, is unusual. The high payout rates in the sample may be
partly due to how endowment balances and distributions are reported on Form 990 Schedule
D. The endowment balance is a total of an organization's perm endowment, term endowment,
and quasi-endowment funds. The amounts distributed for facilities and programs include not
only withdrawn amounts but also “amounts disinvested from an organization's quasi-
endowments to reduce or eliminate capital investment” (The IRS, 2017, p. 4). In other words,
the high payout rates may reflect not only the distributions directed by endowment spending
policies but also changes in quasi-endowment funds. To avoid the undue influence by outliers,
for each type of organizations, the regression analyses exclude organizations with a mean or
standard deviation of payout rates at the top or bottom 1 % (1,392 observations).vii
6.3 | Characteristics of endowments and operations by type of
organizations
Table 2 reports the characteristics of endowments and operations between 2009 and 2016 for
the sample of organizations (N = 15,059), including museums (n = 297 organizations), universi-
ties (n = 787), hospitals (n = 366), and K-12 schools (n = 620).


















No 187 9.5 5.9% 2.9% 7.5% 15,059
Yes 19.8 0.45 4.5% 7.1% 5.7% 9,671
Note: Dollar amounts are inflation adjusted to 2017 dollars. The reported numbers represent the mean values.
QU 13
TABLE 2 Characteristics of endowments and operations by type of organizations, 2009–2016
Variables Type Mean Median SD
Endowment fund size
Endowment beginning balance ($ M) Museums 56.7 7.9 193
Universities 393 49.3 1890
Hospitals 82.4 11.1 424
K-12 schools 31.8 9.3 79.7
Endowment-to-expense Museums 3.37 2.45 3.15
Universities 1.14 0.68 1.48
Hospitals 0.21 0.04 0.94
K-12 schools 1.19 0.72 1.52
Endowment payout
Payout amount ($ M) Museums 2.96 0.41 10.10
Universities 19.20 2.22 93.90
Hospitals 6.20 0.57 29.40
K-12 schools 1.61 0.41 3.91
Payout rate (%) Museums 6.2 4.9 5.7
Universities 4.8 4.3 3.6
Hospitals 9.0 4.3 11.8
K-12 schools 5.5 4.3 5.5
Payout-to-expense Museums 0.20 0.13 0.26
Universities 0.06 0.03 0.08
Hospitals 0.01 0.002 0.04
K-12 schools 0.06 0.03 0.09
Endowment returns
Return on investment (%) Museums 7.5 7.6 7.4
Universities 8.0 9.2 7.7
Hospitals 6.1 4.7 8.1
K-12 schools 7.6 8.6 7.7
Contributions to endowment
Contributions to endowment (%) Museums 5.6 0.6 19.3
Universities 4.9 2.4 17.7
Hospitals 11.2 2.7 29.2
K-12 schools 6.2 1.9 18.8
Organizational operations
Growth rates of non-endowment income (%) Museums 2.4 1.3 39.1
Universities 2.0 1.9 11.6
Hospitals 2.4 2.5 9.9
K-12 schools 2.6 1.9 16.0
Non-endowment income ($ M) Museums 12.1 2.9 30.7
Universities 213.0 72.1 569.0
Hospitals 565.0 312.0 878.0
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6.3.1 | Endowment fund size
By both mean and median of endowment beginning balance, universities have the largest
endowment funds (Mean = 393 M, Med = 49.3 M). In comparison, hospitals (Mean = 82.4 M,
Med = 11.1 M), museums (Mean = 56.7 M, Med = 7.9 M), and K-12 schools (Mean = 31.8 M,
Med = 9.3 M) have much smaller endowment funds. The large standard deviations indicate
that endowment size also varies drastically within each type of organizations.
From another angle, the endowment-to-expense ratio measures the relative size of an
endowment fund to organizational total expenses. Museums have the largest mean and median
endowment-to-expense ratio (Mean = 3.37, Med = 2.45), while hospital have the smallest ratio
(Mean = 0.21, Med = 0.04). Universities (Mean = 1.14, Med = 0.68) and K-12 schools
(Mean = 1.19, Med = 0.72) have similar levels of endowment-to-expense ratio.
6.3.2 | Endowment payout
Hospitals have the highest average payout rate but the median rate is similar to that of universi-
ties and K-12 schools (Mean = 9.0%, Med = 4.3%). Museums have the second largest average
payout rate and the largest median value (Mean = 6.2%, Med = 4.9%), followed by K-12 schools
(Mean = 5.5%, Med = 4.3%). Universities have the lowest average payout rate (Mean = 4.8%,
Med = 4.3%). By dollar amounts, however, universities have the largest mean and median pay-
out amounts, leading hospitals, museums, and K-12 schools.
Payout-to-expense ratio provides another indicator of endowment payout behavior. It mea-
sures the relative importance of endowment distributions to an organization's total expenses,
and demonstrates the dependence on endowment payout for operating budget (Calabrese &
Ely, 2017). Museums apparently are the most reliant on endowment payouts among all types of
organizations (Mean = 0.20, Med = 0.13) and hospitals are the least reliant (Mean = 0.01,
Med = 0.002). Universities and K-12 schools have similar mean and median payout-to-expense
ratio (Mean = 0.06, Med = 0.03).
6.3.3 | Endowment returns
Universities have the largest mean and median returns (Mean = 8.0%, Med = 9.2%), followed
by K-12 schools (Mean = 7.6%, Med = 8.6%) and museums (Mean = 7.5%, Med = 7.6%),
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Variables Type Mean Median SD
K-12 schools 18.4 14.8
Total expenses ($ M) Museums 15.0 4.3 39.3
Universities 229.0 75.4 626.0
Hospitals 545.0 300.0 853.0
K-12 schools 19.2 15.3 16.3
Note: Dollar amounts are inflation adjusted to 2017 dollars. Sample size: 297 museums, 787 universities, 366 hos-
pitals, 620 K-12 schools.
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whereas hospitals have the smallest returns (Mean = 6.1%, Med = 4.7%). The different levels of
investment returns across types of organizations are likely to be driven by their asset allocation
strategy (Qu, 2020).
6.3.4 | Contributions to endowment
By the relative size of contributions to endowment (i.e., percentage of endowment beginning
balance), hospitals have the largest mean percentage of contributions to endowment
(Mean = 11.2%, Med = 2.7%), followed by K-12 schools (Mean = 6.2%, Med = 1.9%), and
museums that have the smallest median percentage (Mean = 5.6%, Med = 0.6%). A significant
proportion of these organizations receive no contributions in certain years. Finally, universities
have the smallest mean percentage of contributions to endowment but a comparatively high
median value (Mean = 4.9%, Med = 2.4%), with most universities regularly receiving contribu-
tions to their endowments every year.
6.3.5 | Organizational operations
Turning to the operational side, Table 2 also reported summary statistics of non-endowment
income, total expenses, as well as the growth rates of non-endowment income. The average
non-endowment income growth rates range from 2.0% for universities (Med = 1.9%) to 2.6% for
K-12 schools (Med = 1.9%). By median values, however, hospitals have the largest growth rates
(Med = 2.5%, Mean = 2.4%), whereas museums have the smallest growth rates (Med = 1.3%,
Mean = 2.4%). Hospitals also have the highest mean and median non-endowment income
(Mean = 565 M, Med = 312 M) and total expenses (Mean = 545 M, Med = 300 M), with univer-
sities in the second place (Mean income = 213 M, Med income = 72 M; Mean expenses = 229 M,
Med expenses =75 M). K-12 schools and museums have much smaller non-endowment income
and total expenses.
6.3.6 | Summary
These descriptive statistics highlight important differences in endowment funds and operations
across types of organizations. First, compared to other types of organizations, museums have
smaller endowment funds. They also have the smallest non-endowment income and total
expenses. However, museums appear to be the most reliant on endowment payouts to fund
their total expenses among all. Their median payout rate is close to 5%, higher than other types
of organizations.
Second, universities have larger endowment funds and better investment performance than
other types of organizations. Most universities receive contributions to their endowments every
year. Universities also have relatively large non-endowment income and total expenses (second
to hospitals). Compared to others, university endowments pay out more dollar amounts but not
in terms of payout rates.
Third, hospitals are the least reliant on endowment payouts to fund total expenditures. Hos-
pitals also have the lowest investment performance compared to other types of organizations,
possibly due to more conservative investment strategies. In addition, hospitals have the largest
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non-endowment income and total expenses. Although the median payout rate is similar to that
of universities and K-12 schools, hospitals have the largest average payout rate, suggesting very
high payout rates by some organizations. Note that many hospitals rely on debt to support their
capital expenditures (e.g., equipment, facilities) and have a focus on maintaining liquidity and
bond ratings required by the rating agencies (Commonfund Institute, 2018b). This may affect
the both endowment investment and spending by hospitals.
Lastly, K-12 schools are much smaller institutions with the smallest endowment funds and
relatively small non-endowment income and total expenses. However, some endowment char-
acteristics of K-12 schools are similar to those of universities. For example, they have a similar
mean and median endowment-to-expense ratio. They also have a similar level of dependence
on endowment payouts for total expenditures. The median payout rate is the same for both, but
K-12 schools have higher average payout rates.
The different characteristics of endowments and organizational operations may imply differ-
ent relations between endowment spending and endowment investment performance, non-
endowment operating income, as well as contributions to endowment. Therefore, the following
regression analyses separately examine each type of organizations.
7 | REGRESSION RESULTS: CHANGES IN ANNUAL
ENDOWMENT PAYOUT RATES
Table 3 reports results from the fixed-effects specifications, which examine if changes in annual
endowment payout rates are related to contemporaneous and lagged changes in endowment
returns, non-endowment income growth rates, and contributions to endowment. The regres-
sions include both year and organizational fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by organi-
zation to allow for correlations among observations of a given organization over time. All
models are statistically significant.
7.1 | Endowment returns
The payout responses to endowment returns differ by type of organizations. Museums
(β = .10, p < .05) experiencing higher-than-average contemporaneous positive returns have
higher annual payout rates. The coefficient on contemporaneous negative returns is also posi-
tive, although not significant. Universities (β = −.05, p < .05) with higher positive returns in
the prior year have lower annual payout rates. This is possible if the majority of the sample
uses the moving-average method that is based on prior endowment values. As reviewed previ-
ously, this method is associated with higher payout rates in declining markets (via decreasing
endowment value) and lower payout rates in rising market (via increasing endowment value).
The coefficient on lagged negative returns is also negative but not significant. For K-12
schools, the coefficient on lagged negative returns is significant and negative (β = −.13,
p < .05), suggesting that organizations experiencing lower negative returns in the prior year
have higher payout rates. It is also worth mentioning that when examining returns without
decomposing into negative and positive parts, the coefficient on lagged returns is not signifi-
cant (Supporting Information). A post-estimation test further shows that positive and negative
returns have significantly different relationships with endowment payout rates (p < .05), indi-
cating asymmetric endowment payout responses to positive and negative endowment returns.
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Finally, the results on endowment returns for hospitals are not statistically significant. The
coefficient estimates for the contemporaneous and lagged positive and negative returns are
significant for museums (p < .05) and universities (p < .001), and marginally significant for
K-12 school (p < .10), but not significant for hospitals (p > .10). Therefore, except for
TABLE 3 Fixed effects regressions on annual endowment payout rates
Museums Universities Hospitals K-12 schools
Positive endowment returnsi,t 0.104
** 0.00971 0.0393 −0.0335
(0.0473) (0.0335) (0.0442) (0.0330)
Negative endowment returnsi,t 0.0812 0.0375 −0.00293 0.0382
(0.0960) (0.0522) (0.164) (0.0435)
Positive endowment returnsi,t-1 0.0115 −0.0468** −0.0473 0.00116
(0.0289) (0.0190) (0.0348) (0.0274)
Negative endowment returnsi,t-1 0.102 −0.0233 0.101 −0.130**
(0.113) (0.0403) (0.191) (0.0579)
Positive revenue growthi,t −0.00713 0.00861 −0.00698 0.00594
(0.00558) (0.00602) (0.0274) (0.00616)
Negative revenue growthi,t −0.00345 0.0182*** 0.0713 0.0159
(0.00480) (0.00661) (0.0512) (0.0105)
Positive revenue growthi,t-1 −0.00606 −0.000663 0.00715 0.00457
(0.00376) (0.00479) (0.0333) (0.00696)
Negative revenue growthi,t-1 −0.00205 0.00814 −0.0329 0.0126
(0.00427) (0.00914) (0.0309) (0.00991)
Contributions to endowmenti,t 0.00218 −0.00866* 0.0489** 0.0292**
(0.00780) (0.00481) (0.0198) (0.0133)
Contributions to endowmenti,t-1 −0.00936* −0.0103*** 0.0123 −0.00547
(0.00559) (0.00363) (0.0185) (0.00587)
Year and organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0519**** 0.0500**** 0.0649**** 0.0530****
(0.00548) (0.00354) (0.00610) (0.00429)
Joint p value of endowment returns .0141** .0002**** .5797 .0610*
Joint p value of revenue growth .5166 .0773* .1938 .3268
Joint p value of contributions to endowment .1934 .0186** .0443** .0588*
Model p value .0016*** .0000**** .0087*** .0000****
Observations 1,409 4,273 1869 3,136
Number of organizations 297 787 366 620
Note: The dependent variable is the annual endowment payout rates between 2010 and 2016. Year and organiza-






hospitals, Hypothesis 1 (null hypothesis) is rejected for the other three types of organizations
at 5% or 10% level.
7.2 | Operating income
The endowment payout response to changes in non-endowment income growth rates is small,
if any. Specifically, universities (β = 0.02, p < .01) have lower (higher) payout rates when
experiencing lower (higher) contemporaneous negative income growth. The coefficients on the
non-endowment income growth variables are not significant for other types of organizations.
The coefficient estimates for the contemporaneous and lagged positive and negative revenue
growth are marginally significant for universities (p < .10) but not significant for others
(p > .10). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 (null hypothesis) is rejected for universities at the 10% level
but not for other types of organizations.
7.3 | Contributions to endowment
The changes in annual payout rates for museums are negatively associated with lagged changes
in contributions to endowments, although the relation is small and only marginally significant
(β = −.009, p < .10). Similarly, for universities, the payout rates slightly decrease with increas-
ing contributions to endowments in the previous year (β = −.010, p < .01), and the result is
marginally significant for contemporaneous changes (β = −.009, p < .10). This is possible when
contributions to an endowment increase the size of the endowment and the policy payout rate
remains unchanged. In contrast, the changes in payout rates are positively associated with con-
temporaneous changes in contributions to endowments for both hospitals (β = .049, p < .05)
and K-12 schools (β = .029, p < .05), with larger magnitudes. This is likely when contributions
to endowments are pass-through gifts that are used for current-year operations rather than as
restricted gifts. The coefficient estimates for the contemporaneous and lagged contributions to
endowment are significant universities (p < .05) and hospitals (p < .05), and marginally signifi-
cant for K-12 school (p < .10), but not significant for museums (p > .10). Therefore, Hypothesis
3 (null hypothesis) is rejected for all types of organizations but museums. Table 4 summarizes
TABLE 4 Hypothesis testing results
Null hypothesis Museums Universities Hospitals K-12 schools
H1 Rejected Rejected Not rejected Rejected
(p < .05) (p < .001) (p > .10) (p < .10)
H2 Not rejected Rejected Not rejected Not rejected
(p > .10) (p < .10) (p > .10) (p > .10)
H3 Not rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
(p > .10) (p < .05) (p < .05) (p < .10)
Note: Reported in the parenthesis are p values from joint tests of coefficients on each set of independent
variables.
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the hypothesis testing results by type of nonprofits based on joint tests of corresponding
variables.
8 | DISCUSSION
The descriptive results demonstrate cross-sectional differences in endowment funds and organi-
zational operations both across and within each type of organizations. Moreover, in the initial
sample, the annual payout rates spread from 0 to nearly 100% of the year-end endowment value
during the period of 2009 and 2016. This supports the finding by Brown and Tiu (2014), who
note a substantial increase in the sample-wide variation in payout rates among universities after
2008. This study also finds that organizations paying out nothing from their endowments
mostly have small funds, consistent with the finding by Dahiya and Yermack (2018).
The post-recession period between 2009 and 2016 also witnesses some within-organization
variations in endowment spending. What drives an organization's annual payout rates to devi-
ate from its expected level (i.e., organizational average level)? The answers vary by type of orga-
nizations. The annual payout rates of museums increase with higher-than-expected
contemporaneous positive endowment returns. In contrast, hospitals, with relatively lower
investment returns and volatility, as well as lower dependence on endowment spending on
average, do not seem to adjust payout rates responding to changes in endowment returns.
Both universities and K-12 schools appear to respond to lagged changes in endowment
returns, but in different ways. For K-12 schools, the payout rates increase following lower-than-
expected negative returns in the prior year but remain unchanged following changes in positive
returns. In contrast, the payout rates of universities decrease slightly with higher lagged positive
returns. This finding is partly consistent with prior research on university endowment spending
between 1993 and 2009. For example, Brown et al. (2014) reports a negative and significant
effect of lagged positive endowment shocks on payout rates. However, the finding does not sup-
port the endowment hoarding objective suggested by Brown et al. (2014).
As to non-endowment income growth rates, the only significant result is found among univer-
sities, but indicates that those with lower-than-expected contemporaneous negative income growth
have lower endowment payout rates. The results are not significant for other types of organiza-
tions. Admittedly, the period between 2009 and 2016 is less turbulent than a period that includes
recessions. Nonetheless, over a third of the organization-year observations experienced negative
non-endowment income growth rates. The findings offer little support for the rainy-day-fund
objective, which posits that an endowment serves as a buffer against overall financial shocks.
Finally, contributions to endowment seem to play different roles for different types of orga-
nizations. For museums and universities, contributions to endowment may be mostly restricted
gifts that help grow the endowment assets. For hospitals and K-12 schools, contributions to
endowment may be mostly used to support to current expenditures. This may explain the high
payout rates at the top quartile for hospitals. In addition, without controlling for contributions
to endowment, the coefficient on contemporaneous negative non-endowment income growth
rates is significantly negative for K-12 schools. However, the result reduces to non-significant
after controlling for contributions to endowment. This may suggest that unrestricted donations
to endowment helps cushion negative revenue changes and smooth out endowment spending.
This study takes advantage of the recently available data on nonprofit endowments from the
IRS Form 990 Schedule D. Before the IRS redesigned the Form 990 in 2008, endowment infor-
mation was not available. Scholars studying endowment behavior used various proxy measures
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of endowment balance and the results were not directly comparable (Calabrese & Ely, 2017).
University endowments have received the most scholarly attention, partly benefiting from the
NACUBO endowment survey data since the 1980s. However, the other types of operating public
charities that also hold endowments are largely understudied. The new endowment data pro-
vide opportunities to examine endowment spending empirically and compare other types of
nonprofits with universities.
Admittedly, there are issues remain unanswered from the current data. First, Form 990 does
not include information on the endowment spending rules and policy payout rates. Knowing
this information would help us to better understand when, how, and why organizations deviate
from their policy payout rates. Second, a question of policy interest is how endowments respond
to financial shocks. The estimation of exogenous shocks requires data that covers a long time
period but the e-filer data are only available since 2009. As more years' data become available
(especially the data during and following the pandemic), future research will be able to better
observe the time-varying patterns of endowment spending. As for now, this study remains the
first attempt to examine within-organization variations of endowment spending for operating
public charities beyond universities.
9 | CONCLUSION
There has been growing public attention on the use of endowment assets, especially since the
2008 recession. Facing the current COVID-19 pandemic, endowed nonprofits are confronted with
the problem on whether they should tap more heavily into endowment spending to avoid budget
cuts. This reflects an ongoing inquiry on the purpose of endowments, particularly, should endow-
ments be treated as rainy day funds? Much of the literature has been on how endowments should
be spent, but less is on how endowments are actually spent. This study provides empirical evi-
dence on endowment spending behavior. It highlights heterogeneity in endowment characteris-
tics across four types of operating charities that hold considerable endowment assets in the
nonprofit sector, including museums, universities, hospitals, and K-12 schools. It shows that dif-
ferent types of organizations have different payout responses to changes in endowment returns,
other operating income, and contributions to endowment. However, it does not find evidence that
supports the rainy-day-fund objective. Additionally, it shows that the contributions to endowment
play different roles for different types of organizations, either as restricted funds that grow endow-
ment assets or as alternative funding that supports current expenditure. Hence, additional to the
current debate on the role and use of endowment funds as rainy funds, endowment management
may also need to separately consider developing non-restricted donations to endowment that
may help smooth endowment spending.
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i An exception is when an organization spends a fixed percentage of the endowment value specified in the policy.
In this case, the effective spending rate is the same as the policy rate. The rate does not change annually but
spending dollars do.
ii For Line 1 items on Schedule D Part V, nonprofits can report up to 4 years back besides the current year. The
historical data, if available, are used to replace missing values and verify reported values in prior years.
iii The public benefit subsector also represented a large share of the cleaned sample (19%). However, this sub-
sector is dominated by local chapters of YMCA, YWCA, YMHA, and YWHA, and so was excluded from the
analysis.
iv Brown et al. (2014) used revenue from the government to construct their revenue shock variables. They also
noted that the results were essentially unchanged when including all revenue sources to construct their reve-
nue shock variables.
v Other alternative funding includes disinvesting quasi-endowments or borrowing. However, these variables are
potentially endogenous variables and so cannot be included in the model.
vi The model does not control for organizational size because it might be jointly determined with endowment
payout rates. Nonetheless, alternative analyses that include lagged log of total assets show that the main
results are qualitatively similar while assets are not significant.
vii Organizations with very high (top 1%) or low (bottom 1%) standard deviations of endowment returns, or very
high standard deviations of non-endowment income growth rates were excluded. Several organizations with
extremely large contributions to their endowments (e.g., over 500%) were also excluded.
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